

SAC SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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Approved for Release
July 2000

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ACTION UNIT:

INFO

[REDACTED] 26 OCT 70 CITE SANTIAGO [REDACTED]

26 Oct 19

DIRECTOR

and 2

[REDACTED] document 12

1. STATION ASSUMES THAT POLICIES GOVERNING FUTURE DEALINGS WITH ALLENDE REGIME WILL SOON BE UNDER ACTIVE REVIEW. WHATEVER POLICIES EMERGE, IT OBVIOUS THAT STATION'S COVERT PROGRAMMING WILL HAVE TO BE GEARED TO MEET USG'S SPECIFIC POLICY NEEDS, ESPECIALLY IF CHOSEN POSTURE IS ONE OF IMPLACABLE HOSTILITY TOWARD ALLENDE'S CHILE.

2. IF OVERRIDING U.S.G. OBJECTIVE REMAINS THAT OF TOPPLING ALLENDE, [REDACTED] WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO SERVE AS SPEARHEAD OF SWEEPING EFFORT TO UNDERMINE REGIME. TO LARGE EXTENT THIS WILL DENY STATION ADVANTAGES OF OPERATING, AS IT NOW DOES, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN ANY CASE, [REDACTED] WILL HAVE TO WIND DOWN SOME QUASI-OVERT ACTIVITIES AND ADAPT ITS MODUS OPERANDI TO EXIGENCIES OF HOSTILE DENIED AREA ENVIRONMENT.

3. UNDER AUSPICES OF [REDACTED] ALLENDE CONFRONTATION, STATION'S [REDACTED] PROGRAM MAY SOON BE OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS SINCE MOST [REDACTED] ARE NOT TRULY

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PAGE 2 SANTIAGO [REDACTED]

EQUIPPED TO WITHSTAND RIGORS OF POLICE STATE WHICH WILL BE EXPERTLY ADVISED BY CUBANS AND SOVIETS. U.S.G. CHALLENGE OF ALLENDE REGIME'S RIGHT TO EXIST WOULD SOON BE REFLECTED IN AMERICAN ATTITUDES AT CONFERENCE TABLE. ALLENDE WOULD THEN RIGHTLY INFER THAT THIS POLICY IS BUTTRESSED BY U.S.G.'S COVERT ACTION ARM. WE ANTICIPATE THEREFORE THAT ALLENDE WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO MOVE AGAINST [REDACTED] "OFFICIAL" LODGMENTS IN CHILE. WITH [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] EXPERTISE AT THEIR ELBOW, CHILEAN SECURITY SERVICES COULD IN SHORT ORDER OBTAIN FAIRLY ACCURATE PICTURE OF "WHO IS WHO" IN EMBASSY. IN ANY NUMBER OF QUASI-LEGITIMATE WAYS ALLENDE MIGHT DECIDE TO GO ABOUT ELIMINATING OR NEUTRALIZING EXISTING [REDACTED] COMPONENT.

4. IN ANTICIPATION OF ALLENDE'S RETALIATION, HQS WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO START PLANNING [REDACTED]

5. STATION HAS BEEN REPORTING ON CERTAIN INDICATIONS THAT ALLENDE AND HIS SOVIET ALLIES WOULD WELCOME AT LEAST

PAGE 3 SANTIAGO [REDACTED]

TEMPORARY DETENTE BETWEEN CHILE AND U.S. WE BUT IT PAST
NEITHER ALLENDE NOR SOVIETS TO PUSH LINE (MAINLY FOR U.S.
CONSUMPTION) THAT ALLENDE OUGHT NOT BE LEFT TO TENDER
MERCIES OF PCCH OR CUBA. THIS KIND OF MESSAGE, EMANATING
FROM SOVIETS, HAS ALREADY REACHED STATION. (SEE [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] "EVEN IF ALLENDE WINS THE ELECTION AND TAKES OFFICE,
HE WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THE REALITIES OF
UNITED STATES INFLUENCE IN SHAPING THE POLICIES OF HIS
GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION
TO SUPPORT AN ALLENDE GOVERNMENT LOGISTICALLY AS IT HAS
THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT, AND THERE IS EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE
THAT AN ALLENDE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT
IN ITS POLICIES FROM THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT.")

6. AT RISK OF FEEDING MORE GRIST INTO MILLS OF CI
SPECIALISTS, WE ARE INCLINED TO VIEW [REDACTED] RECENT
REQUEST IN SAME CONTEXT AS ABOVE-MENTIONED SOVIET SOUNDINGS;
IT TOO PREDICATES NEED FOR "FOSTERING U.S. SUPPORT FOR
ALLENDE".

7. IF U.S.G. DECIDES THAT CHILEAN SITUATION CALLS

PAGE 4 SANTIAGO [REDACTED]

FOR WATCHFUL WAITING, THIS MAY ALLOW CHILE'S POWER Factions (which, in any case, it will take Allende considerable time to bring under his monolithic sway) to reorient their political bearings and find natural levels of involvement in national affairs.

8. Realistically speaking, station sponsorship of political action [REDACTED] would be difficult to reconcile with strategy of coup d'etat. Nor would, under those conditions, reconstitution of "viable center" make much sense. If, on other hand, station mandate is "to wean Allende away from communists", which is also Partido Nacional's objective and, one might presume, goal of PDC right wing elements, then our covert program logically fits into context of new U.S.G. policy framework, envisioning peaceful competition with Soviets and Cubans, in which U.S. might still come out on top.

9. Station's daily existence would be equally troublesome within U.S. policy framework which do not impinge on our

PAGE 5 SANTIAGO [REDACTED]

SPHERE OF INTEREST.

10. FROM STATION'S PARACHIAL VIEWPOINT WORST OF ALL CONCEIVABLE ALTERNATIVES WOULD BE CONTINUING POLICY VACUUM VIS A VIS CHILE WHICH COULD HAVE CALAMITOUS CONSEQUENCES. DURING LAST THREE YEARS, STATION HAS BEEN OPERATING BY SEAT OF ITS PANTS, NAVIGATING PRECARIOUSLY BETWEEN SCYLLA OF AMBASSADOR'S EVER CHANGING PERCEPTIONS AND CARYBDIS OF DEPSTATE'S ADAMANT REFUSAL TO CONCEDE NEED FOR ANY KIND OF CHILE POLICY. THIS LUXURY WE COULD AFFORD WHILE RELATIVELY BENIGN CLIMATE OF FREI ADMINISTRATION LASTED. TO CONFRONT ALLENDE REGIME UNDER COMPARABLE CONDITIONS OF STRATEGIC DISSARRAY, WILL SADDLE [REDACTED] WITH RESPONSIBILITY IT SIMPLY MAY NOT BE EQUIPPED TO DISCHARGE EFFECTIVELY.

11. AMBASSADOR UPON RETURN FROM CONSULTATION REMARKED TO COS THAT DURING COMPARATIVELY BRIEF STAY IN WASHINGTON HE MANAGED NOT ONLY TO DRAFT DEPSTATE'S POLICY GUIDANCE TO HIMSELF, BUT CHART FUTURE COURSE OF STATION'S COVERT PROGRAM. WHAT WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ARE

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PAGE 6 SANTIAGO

CONSEQUENCES BOUND TO FLOW FROM POLICY IMPROVISATIONS IN
SANTIAGO AND POLICY STALEMATE IN WASHINGTON, USHERING IN
ANOTHER SERIES OF AD HOC [REDACTED] MANDATES WRUNG FROM
RELUCTANT DEPSTATE. ALSO, STATION DREADS BEING REQUIRED
TO EXECUTE PROGRAM WHICH IN EFFECT PUTS SEAL OF APPROVAL
ON AMBASSADOR'S UNREALISTIC NOTIONS ABOUT DECISIVE ROLE PDC
CAN EFFECTIVELY PLAY DURING ALLENDE REGIME AND HIS IMPLICIT
PROSCRIPTION OF CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS WHO COULD AND ARE
PREDISPOSED TO PLAY SOME ROLE IN SUPPORT OF U.S. POLICY
OBJECTIVES.

12. IN PONDERING STATION'S FUTURE COURSE,

[REDACTED]
AMB,

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PAGE 7. SANTIAGO

AFTER LATEST TRIP TO WASHINGTON, QUOTED APPROVINGLY STATEMENT MADE TO HIM BY VISITING SENIOR DIPLOMAT STATIONED IN MAJOR EUROPEAN CAPITAL, TO EFFECT THAT HE AND HE ALONE ENGAGES IN POLITICAL ACTION. THE IMPLICIT WARNING WAS CLEAR.

13.